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ABSTRACT:  
We investigate whether people enrolled into voluntary health insurance (VHI) substitute 
public consumption with private (opt out) or just enlarge their private consumption, without 
reducing reliance upon public provisions (top up). We study the case of Italy, where a 
mixed insurance system is in place. To this purpose, we specify a joint model for public and 
private specialist visits counts, and allow for different degrees of endogenous 
supplementary insurance coverage, looking at the insurance coverage as driven by a 
trinomial choice process. We disentangle the effect of income and wealth by going through 
two channels: the direct impact on the demand for healthcare and that due to selection into 
VHI. We find evidence of opting out: richer and wealthier individuals consume more 
private services and concomitantly reduce those services publicly provided through 
selection into for-profit VHI. These results imply that the market for VHI eases the 
redistribution from high income (doubly insured) individuals to low income (not doubly 
insured) ones operated by the Italian National Health Service (NHS). Accounting for VHI 
endogeneity in the joint model of the two counts is crucial to this conclusion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The appropriate relative sizes and roles of public and private sectors in financing healthcare 
are under debate in many countries. Countries that rely upon public financing are 
considering an expanded role for private healthcare finance as a way to reduce pressure on 
public budgets. This push, quite often, comes through a carrot-and-stick strategy. Reduction 
in coverage by statutory health insurance (SHI) and increased reliance on rationing-by-
waiting force individuals to seek care in the private market. Besley et al. (1999) suggest 
that waiting time to access public provisions is a relevant determinant of the demand for 
voluntary health insurance (VHI) in England (see also Foubister et al. (2006)). Aarbu 
(2010) indicates this as the mechanism behind the rapid increase in private insurance 
coverage in Norway. At the same time, relaxing regulations on access to private health 
insurance and introducing tax deductions and incentives to buy supplementary coverage 
might ease the process. Recently, in Canada a 2005 Supreme Court decision abolished a 
law prohibiting complementary private insurance (Cuff et al. (2010)). Srivastava and Zhao 
(2008) document that Australia, in the late nineties, introduced several incentives and 
penalties to stem erosion in VHI. Similarly, a large use of tax incentives for the purchase of 
VHI is observed in Portugal, since 1999, and Ireland, since the 1970s (see Mossialos and 
Thomson (2004)).  
However, concerns about tax incentives, to promote the take-up of VHI, being regressive, 
expensive and ineffective in stimulating demand, led, in recent years, to a clear trend 
towards abolishing or reducing their use. Tax incentives are, quite likely, to be regressive, 
provided that subscribers, most of the time, are in the upper tail of income distribution. This 
effect is even larger if, as noted by Davies (1999), tax relief is applied at the marginal tax 
rate. Moreover, effectiveness is also questionable whenever incentives compensate 
individuals, with VHI that may be paying for better amenities, without reducing their 
consumption of statutory healthcare. Mossialos and Thomson (2004) notice that reduction 
in tax incentives, devoted to encouraging VHI , occurred in Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain and the UK.  
This policy debate centers on two general arguments. Advocates of parallel private finance, 
argue that increasing private financing in healthcare can be beneficial to society: it would 
reduce demand pressure on the public provisions thus freeing resources to improve quality 
and to ease access to needed care. Opponents, on the other hand, dispute that private 
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finance, by drawing resources away from the publicly financed system, would produce 
exactly the opposite. Much of the issue stands along the empirical value of the Besley and 
Coate (1991) conjecture. According to it, the public provision of healthcare can work as a 
redistributive device, whenever low income citizens choose the publicly provided good, 
while high income citizens, who contribute to subsidizing the public supply through income 
taxes, decide to opt out to the private sector. VHI might strengthen the redistributive role 
played by the SHI, as far as richer individuals are also more inclined to buy supplementary 
health insurance, thus, being less cost conscious when they consume private healthcare 
supplements.  
We investigate the redistributive role of VHI in Italy, where a prominent share of the 
healthcare supply is publicly provided by the National Health Service (NHS), and about 
21% of the population is covered by some form of VHI. Our research question is, whether 
people enrolled into VHI substitute public consumption with private (i.e. opt out) or, 
alternatively, they just enlarge their private consumption, without reducing reliance upon 
public provisions, (i.e. top up). To this purpose, we model the joint demand for public and 
private healthcare visits, accounting for the endogeneity of health insurance status. We 
consider different degrees of endogenous supplementary insurance coverage, looking at it 
as driven by a trinomial choice process. We distinguish between not-for-profit (NFP) VHI 
and for profit (FP) VHI. The resulting modeling framework is a simultaneous equation 
system with multinomial endogenous treatment. This represents a contribution to the 
literature on count data models which has either developed methods to address the 
endogeneity of a multinomial treatment in a single equation approach (see, for example, 
Deb and Trivedi (2006), for a simulation based classical estimation approach, or Munkin 
and Trivedi (2008), for a Bayesian analysis) or has jointly specified multiple equations 
sharing a common binary endogenous variable (see, for example, Zimmer and Trivedi 
(2006), for a Copula based estimation, or Chai Cheng and Vahid (2010), for a simulation 
based classical estimation approach). Our generalization to multiple equations is of 
particular relevance. Since the insurance regressors are endogenous in both count 
equations, ignoring their bivariate nature and estimating separately two univariate counts 
with endogenous treatment would lead to invalid inference on the treatment effects and 
other parameters of interest. 
We find that having FP VHI coverage increases the demand for private visits, 
concomitantly reducing demand for public visits. The substitution effect prevails on the 
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direct effect exerted by income and wealth on healthcare consumption. This implies that the 
better-off individuals, who more frequently buy VHI coverage, opt out of the public 
provision, so that the Italian NHS redistributes, from high income to low income 
individuals, through the operation of the VHI market. We prove that selection effects into 
VHI, due to unobservables, are substantial in our case study. Allowing for the endogeneity 
of insurance status is crucial for the inference on healthcare insurance effects and other key 
parameters on which the answer to our research question relies. Under exogeneity, the 
results would imply the opposite conclusion that the more affluent individuals top up rather 
than opt out. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the econometric model. 
Section 3 provides a concise institutional background on the Italian NHS, the market for 
voluntary insurance and the market for physician care in Italy, introducing at the same time 
the dependent variables of our model. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the 
empirical specification and illustrates the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. A BIVARIATE COUNT DATA MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS 
MULTINOMIAL TREATMENT  
Our econometric model comprises two blocks of equations: a trinomial insurance choice 
model (treatment equations), and a bivariate count data model for the PUBLIC and 
PRIVATE visit (outcome equations), in which the insurance status is allowed to be 
endogenously determined. We follow the approach of Deb and Trivedi (2006), and account 
for self-selection into insurance status by resorting to a latent factor structure. However, we 
extend their model, which includes a single outcome equation, to the case of the joint 
modeling of two outcome equations. From the economic side, this bivariate SURE 
framework is invoked by our main research question, aimed at measuring to what extent, 
being privately insured leads to a substitution of public with private consumption. From the 
econometric perspective, our bivariate model with endogenous treatment represents the 
proper setting for valid inference. Indeed, when multiple outcomes are simultaneously 
determined and there is a common endogenous variable, reduction to a single equation 
model with endogenous regressor leads to inconsistent estimates of the treatment effects 
and other parameters of interests in the outcome equation. In our case study, public and 
private visit count equations are certainly linked via correlation of unobservable factors -
such as the frailty condition- that cannot be completely controlled for with individual 
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characteristics available in the data (Fabbri and Monfardini (2009) find a positive residual 
correlation between the two health outcomes).  
Let yhi = 0, 1, 2,…. be the number of visits of type h consumed by the individual i, with 
h=PUB, PRIV, and let the dij binary variables indicating whether the individual chooses the 
j-th insurance status alternative (dij=1 if alternative j is chosen; dij=0
 
otherwise), where the 
set of mutually exclusive insurance statuses is given by: 
j = 0: no VHI (only statutory health insurance);  
j = 1: NFP VHI ONLY (doubly insured with NFP VHI only); 
j = 2: FP VHI (doubly insured with FP VHI and possibly NFP VHI)1. 
The indirect utilities, associated with the three alternatives, are defined as: 
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where iw  is a set of individual specific regressors, ijη  are i.i.d and follow a type 1 extreme 
value distribution (leading to multinomial logit model), 1il  is a latent factor representing 
unobserved tastes for voluntary insurance, standard normal i.i.d. and independent of ijη . 
For identification we restrict 00 =α , i.e. j=0 is made the reference state, and we set 
    121 ==δδ to normalize the scale of the latent factor. Notice that this structure makes the 
composite errors, of the utilities associated to alternatives 1 (NFP VHI) and 2 (FP VHI), 
correlated via the common error component 1il . This is a reasonable pattern, since 
alternatives 1 and 2 encompass a common choice, i.e. not-for-profit insurance can be 
owned simultaneously with a private one.2  
The assumptions above define the following mixed multinomial logit structure for the 
insurance status probabilities:
  
                                                     
1
 We are forced to collapse the doubly insured with both FP and NFP VHI into this class since the 
former group represents only the 2.4% of our sample.  
2
 Another possibility would be to estimate a free correlation parameter between utilities associated 
to alternatives 1 and 2. However, identification of this parameter requires alternative specific 
regressors that are not available in our case study. 
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Coming to the outcomes block of the model, we use a Poisson-Normal mixture, assuming 
that each count yhi h=PUB, PRIV, is independently driven by a Poisson process, 
conditionally to the vector of covariates 21,, iii ddz  and to the couple of latent factors 1il , 
2il ; where the second unobservable factor 2il
 
is normal i.i.d and independent of 1il :3 
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The conditional means of the two Poisson processes are: 
)exp(),,,,( 22112211'2121 ihihihihZhiiiiiihihi ddzddzyE llll λλβββµ ++++==
 
Since both latent factors are heterogeneity components common to the two counts, they are 
the source of their simultaneous determination. The first component, 1il , captures selection 
effects into insurance choice: an agent might choose to own any supplementary insurance 
based on unobservables that also determine simultaneously his choice of public versus 
private health care. Therefore, the parameters h1λ  measure the covariance between the 
unobservables, entering the utility associated to supplementary insurance choices, and the 
expected visit consumption h. A positive PRIV1λ  implies that unobservables increasing the 
probability of choosing a voluntary insurance - either not-for-profit or for-profit - will also 
increase private visit consumption. A similar interpretation applies to PUB1λ . The second 
component, 2il , captures co-movements in public and private visit counts that are not 
channeled through insurance choice behavior. We set 02 =PUBλ  since only one of the 
parameters h2λ  is identified, so that PRIV2λ  will measure the covariance between PUB and 
                                                     
3
 We mix the normal latent factor with a Poisson distribution rather than a Negative Binomial one. 
In this way we avoid a further overdispersion source in the model besides that arising from the 
latent factor. We experimented problems in identifying the additional overdispersion parameter 
when using a normal-NB mixture. We are grateful to Partha Deb for pointing out, to us, this 
problem. 
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PRIV visits, conditional on observables characteristics z and insurance status.  
This framework allows us to disentangle the insurance treatment effects on visits of type h, 
hh 11 , ββ , from the possible selection effect for the two types of visits (adverse or positive 
selection on unobservables). The model encompasses a bivariate count model with 
exogenous insurance, when 011 == PUBPRIV λλ . 
Given that the two counts are independent, conditionally on the latent factors, their 
bivariate joint distribution is given by: 
∏
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where vectors λβ ,  collect the parameters of both the public visits and the private visits 
equations, and ),( 21 iii ddd = , ),( 21 iii lll = . 
Let us introduce the short notation, ),|Pr( 1iii wd l , for the mixed logit probabilities of 
treatment introduced above. The likelihood of the model is derived with two steps. First, 
conditionally on the latent factor, the joint distribution of insurance and visit count 
variables is obtained from the usual conditional by marginal density factorization. Second, 
the unobserved latent factors are integrated out:  
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Since the integral above has not closed solution, estimation is performed by maximizing a 
Simulated Likelihood (Gourieroux and Monfort (1996)), which approximates the expected 
value with an average over R pseudo-random draws: 
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The resulting Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimator is close to the MLE provided R is 
sufficiently large. We follow the guidelines which emerged from the literature concerning 
the use of Halton sequences, rather than pseudo-random values, in order to reduce the 
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variance of the simulated likelihood and to speed up convergence (Bhat (2001); Train 
(2002)). We find that R=2000 leads to stable results, corroborating the experience of other 
research on models involving endogenous dummies like ours (see Deb and Trivedi (2006)). 
Both the generation of the Halton sequences, and the maximization of the simulated 
likelihood have been performed within STATA 11 (lf method). 
The Poisson specification we adopt for modeling the visit processes is quite convenient for 
analyzing treatment effects and demand elasticities. When the mean function is like 
)'exp()|( xxyE γµ ==
, the elasticity of the count, with respect to a continuous variable 
regressor kx , is given by:  
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The evaluation of the treatment effect of each insurance dummy amounts, instead, to a 
semi-elasticity and is given by the corresponding coefficient. 
3. THE BACKGROUND OF OUR CASE STUDY 
In this section we present basic institutional backgrounds on the Italian NHS, the market for 
VHI and the market for specialist consultations. We refer to the situation prevailing in the 
year 2000, for which we conduct our empirical exercise. Despite major reforms which took 
place thereafter, most of the features referred to the market for insurance and those for 
consultations are still valid.  
3.1. THE ITALIAN NHS  
The Italian NHS provides comprehensive statutory insurance and uniform healthcare to the 
entire population. Under the Italian Constitution, the State has exclusive power to set the 
"essential levels of care" to be made available to all residents throughout the country. 
Regions have exclusive responsibility for the organization and administration of publicly 
financed healthcare. NHS is mainly financed by general taxation. Funds are transferred 
from the central government to each region, according to a capitation rule, and then 
reallocated among approximately 200 Local Health Authorities (LHAs). Within its budget, 
each LHA is responsible for financing healthcare consumption of the "enrolled" population, 
being also (mainly) responsible for healthcare production. Depending on a citizen's income, 
age and health condition, co-payments are also charged for drugs, out-patient treatments, 
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some diagnostic and laboratory tests, and medical appliances.  
The political allocation rules for public healthcare provisions will necessarily leave some 
people, those at the extremes of the preference distribution, unsatisfied. Publicly-financed 
national health services, almost inevitably, generate a willingness to pay for additional 
private services, whose consumption opportunities might be enlarged by way of VHI 
underwriting. Notice that in the Italian NHS there is no way to unsubscribe from the SHI, 
as in Germany, for instance, so that "ends against the middle" equilibrium (Epple and 
Romano (1996)) cannot emerge except through an impoverishment of public supply.  
3.2. THE MARKET FOR INSURANCE  
According to Italian law, citizens can enlarge their SHI coverage in two ways: buying a 
VHI policy supplied in the commercial insurance market (FP VHI) and obtaining some 
additional coverage by joining into a mutual insurance company (NFP VHI). Mutual 
insurance companies are entirely owned by their policyholders. Group solidarity, limited 
profit sharing, absence of shares and free membership are their distinct traits. 
These two types of VHI play a mixed role with respect to the SHI. Both of them grant 
coverage for consumption of "complementary" and "supplementary" types of provisions. 
According to common definitions in the literature, a provision is said to be complementary 
if it refers to services already provided by the SHI, while it is said to be supplementary if it 
is not granted under the SHI policy. Both markets are almost completely unregulated except 
for some requirements concerning financial stability.  
Despite the types of provisions which are not qualitatively different, coverage granted by 
FP VHI is larger and more complete. Contributions and premiums are concomitantly higher 
in FP plans. In the year 2000, the average contribution to mutual insurances was about 290 
Euros per year, ranging from a minimum of about 85 to a maximum of 660. Corresponding 
figures in the FP VHI plans are about 995 Euros (minimum 500 and maximum 2400).  
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 1 displays the distribution of health insurance status in our sample, which comes 
from ''Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie: condizioni di salute e ricorso ai servizi 
sanitari 1999-2000'', conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, ISTAT, and it 
is representative of Italian males, aged above 18 (see Section 4, for a description of our 
sample selection criteria). Despite the fact that the vast majority of the individuals, 
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amounting to 79%, is covered only from SHI, the shares of people resorting to VHI, either 
NFP or FP is considerable (9.6% and 11.4%, respectively).  
3.3. THE MARKET FOR SPECIALISTS' VISITS  
The Italian NHS plays a major role in the market for specialist consultations where, public, 
closely regulated and mainly salaried specialists, compete with private, less strictly 
regulated ones. Specialized NHS out-patient services, including visits, diagnostics and 
treatment, are provided, either by the LHA’s salaried specialists or by accredited public and 
private facilities, with which the LHA has agreements and contracts. A co-payment, 
discretionary for each region up to a ceiling determined by national law, is required. Since 
these ceilings are well below the market clearing level, queues of patients form, and supply 
is rationed. 
Because of waiting lists, co-payments and unsatisfactory quality, many patients seek care 
outside the NHS, resorting to the private market for specialist care. This market is quite 
well developed. Private specialists are subject to an authorization, based on minimum 
standard requirements, which turn out to be very loose indeed. Fees, quality and most other 
relevant features of private medical practices are mainly subject to market forces. As a 
result, it is generally true that the private alternative to NHS supply is higher priced and, for 
the class of specialist visits we consider here, i.e. excluding hospital out-patient visits, of 
better quality. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 2 shows the two public and private visits’ counts that will be the key dependent 
variables in our model. They include all the specialist consultations except dental care, 
aggregated into a single class of visits within each type of provider, and consumed in the 
span of a month. Low participation rates (5.5% for public visit, 4.6% for private ones) are 
therefore implied. 
3.4. TAX DEDUCTION  
Concerning tax incentives, in the year 2000 19% of the contributions to NFP VHI were tax 
deductible up to a ceiling of 1200 Euro, at the individual average tax rate. No deduction 
was granted for premiums paid to a FP VHI plan and this is, currently, still the case. At the 
same time, notice that 19% of the cumulated out-of-pocket (OOP) payments above a 
minimum of about 110 Euros, is tax deductible. For those covered by a FP VHI, deduction 
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is granted also for the part of OOP payments that have already been refunded by the 
insurance company. This arrangement tends to produce an incentive to adversely select into 
FP VHI. Frail individuals, those who foresee themselves consuming more, would receive 
the same tax incentive to subscribe a NFP VHI as the healthier individuals. While tax 
deduction for OOP payments, on top of FP VHI refunds, makes these plans more attractive 
for the unhealthy, rather than for the healthier, subscribers.  
4. DATA 
Data come from ''Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie: condizioni di salute e 
ricorso ai servizi sanitari” conducted by ISTAT. We use the 1999-2000 survey which is the 
most recent available cross-section where information on an individual's insurance status is 
collected. The full sample contains 52,332 households (140,011 individuals). The survey 
focuses on individual healthcare consumption in the 4 weeks before the interview. 
Individuals are also asked about the amount of money paid out-of-pocket and waiting time 
for obtaining their last visit.  
In our data the insurance status is defined as individual “coverage” from private VHI. We 
restrict our analysis to male householders (HH), aged 18 or above (38,719 observations). In 
this sample, coverage and ownership both tend to coincide. We also drop individuals that 
are hardly insurable: those above 70 years of age, and those affected by severe chronic 
conditions (Parkinson's disease, mental and nervous diseases). Finally, we select out 
observations with degenerate values on INCOME and missing values on FEES (see the 
regressors' description below in Section 5), and are left with a final estimation sample made 
up of 27,945 observations. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 3 provides a preview on the relationship between insurance status and healthcare 
consumption. The overall consumption proves to be quite homogenous across the three 
groups. What clearly matters is the composition in public versus private provision; the 
larger is coverage, the lower is reliance upon public provision and, concomitantly larger, is 
the use of privately supplied visits. This pattern is confirmed by the marginal effects of 
being covered by each class of VHI on the average consumption of visits, estimated with no 
controls and reported in the lower part of the table. 
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5. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
5.1. REGRESSORS 
Our specification of the insurance choice and the visit count models relies upon Fabbri and 
Monfardini (2009). It fully exploits the rich set of information available in the ISTAT 
dataset described above and comprises most covariates that are used in empirical analyses 
of healthcare consumption with endogenous insurance (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (1988); 
Holly et al. (1998); Buchmuller et al. (2004); Deb and Trivedi (2006); Munkin and Trivedi 
(2008)). The block of regressors, which is common to the insurance and the utilization 
equations (or enter only the latter – and therefore do not play any role for identification of 
the insurance dummies coefficients), consists of the following sets of variables.  
Health conditions variables, aimed at measuring individual risk factors, include: EXEMPT, 
a dummy identifying those individuals who are entitled to free public specialist visits due to 
health or economic status; measures of chronic conditions or physical limitations such as 
INVALID, CHRONIC (dummy), NCHRONIC (number of chronic conditions), LIM ADL 
(dummy indicating limitations in the daily activities; SRH good, a dummy indicating 
whether the self-perceived general health status is declared to be good or very good.  
The set of socio-demographics covariates consists of a quadratic specification for AGE, a 
dummy identifying MARRIED individuals, and two education dummies: MEDIUM EDUC 
(if the person holds a secondary school certificate), HIGH EDUC (if he/she holds a 
university degree). We also insert information on employment status and professional 
position, that might drive the insurance choice and at the same time capture differences in 
the individual value of time, through the dummy variables EMPLOYED, SELF-EMPL 
(self-employment), HIGH POSITION (high professional position), HIGH POSITION as 
SELF-EMPL  (high position in self-employment). Individual economic variables, entering 
both the insurance and the utilization equation, comprise a dummy, indicating HOME 
OWNERSHIP and the household disposable INCOME.4 
An important group of regressors is, instead, measured at the level of the Local Health 
Authority (LHA), which is taken as the proper relevant market area for medical 
                                                     
4
 This measure is derived from a matching exercise performed by the Italian National Statistical 
Institute, as the ISMF survey does not have data on household income. By regression matching, 
each household in the sample was assigned the imputed after-tax monthly income, estimated using 
data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth, conducted by the Bank of Italy. This 
measure is then equalized and deflated with household monthly food expenditure at LHA level (see 
Fabbri and Monfardini (2009)). 
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consultation. For a detailed description of these measures, see Fabbri and Monfardini 
(2009), where they have been proposed and developed. A first subset of such regressors is 
common to both insurance and visits equations and captures the overall quality and 
availability of healthcare services supplied by the LHA. These variables include the public 
expenditure per-capita in the LHA, PUBLIC EXP; the PHYSICIAN DENSITY, providing 
a measure of the availability of doctors in the local area; the waiting time to access  the two 
different types of consultation (we insert both variables WAIT PUBLIC and WAIT 
PRIVATE in the visit equation5 and a dummy indicating if the waiting time for public is 
greater than that for a private visit, HIGH DIFF IN WAIT in the insurance model). 
A second subset of variables, at the LHA level, enters the visit equations only. This is 
meant to control for equilibrium conditions in the local healthcare market. Among these 
variables, we include public and private visit fees faced by consumers, FEE PUBLIC and 
FEE PRIVATE; the PRICE  of a NON-FOOD BUNDLE (which is needed to fulfill the 
requirements of a coherent, incomplete system of demand); Finally, to better describe the 
context in which the agents make their choices and to control for other sources of 
geographical variation in healthcare and insurance markets we insert geographical fixed 
effect in the form of regional dummies, and a dummy for individual residing in provincial 
capital, CHIEF TOWN.  
5.2. EXCLUSION RESTRICTIONS 
The key regressors of the two visit equations, are the treatment variables represented by the 
insurance dummies: NFP VHI only and FP VHI. To deal with their endogeneity and to 
achieve identification of the associated causal parameters in the outcome equations, we rely 
upon a set of exclusion restrictions. We propose a set of instrumental variables that are 
determinants of the insurance choice but plausibly do not enter the utilization part of the 
model under the specification outlined above.6 The first source of exclusion restrictions we 
rely upon is quite uncommon in this stream of empirical studies. We take advantage of the 
availability of individual premiums paid for FP VHI in another Italian survey, SHIW 
(Survey on Household Income and Wealth), conducted by the Bank of Italy. Adopting a 
regression matching procedure, we generate the premium that each individual of our 
                                                     
5
 Fabbri and Monfardini (2009) argue that, using the full vector of LHA specific waiting times 
allows to control for the probability of data truncation. Indeed, due to the four week recall period, 
we might fail to observe the full record of individual visits related to a single spell of illness. 
6
 These instrumental variables are needed beyond the non-linear functional form of the model to 
achieve robust identification.  
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sample expects to pay for underwriting a FP VHI plan (variable PREMIUM). This variable 
incorporates exogenous shifters in the supply of insurance arising from geographic 
variation in the market of healthcare insurance.7 The additional instrumental variables we 
posit are referenced in the literature: the presence of dependent children in the household, 
which might affect the propensity to buy additional insurance coverage (CHILDREN, a 
dummy indicating the presence of kids under 18, and #CHILDREN, their number), and a 
set of dummies for the employment sector (AGRICULTURE, RETAIL TRADE, 
TRANSPORTS, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 
EDUCATION). Our argument is that, different employment sectors offer different 
opportunities to enroll into a VHI and also attract individuals with different degrees of risk 
aversion.8 We checked the relevance of the whole set of instruments in the health insurance 
model, strongly rejecting the assumption of their coefficients being jointly equal to zero. 
Insert Table 4 here 
5.3. UTILIZATION RESULTS: TREATMENT AND SELECTION EFFECTS  
Table 5 provides the estimated coefficients on the insurance dummies, both under the null 
of exogeneity and then by accounting for endogeneity. Under exogeneity, being insured 
does not affect the consumption of public visits, irrespective of the type of insurance 
coverage. On the other hand, being covered by FP VHI, with respect to not being doubly 
insured, exerts a significant positive impact on consumption of private visits. Such a 
positive impact, attributable to switching from not being doubly insured to being covered 
by FP VHI, is quite large, i.e. about 42%. Once we allow for endogeneity of insurance 
status, we find that selection effects in VHI, due to unobservables, are substantial in our 
                                                     
7
 The premium prediction is obtained by estimating a Heckman model on a set of regressors that are 
common to the two data sources such as gender, age, macro-area of residence, dimension of the 
municipality of residence. The latter two variables capture exogenous geographical variation in the 
supply side of the local market faced by the individual, and are assumed to determine the insurance 
choice only through their effect on the local market premium. Occupational sector dummies are the 
extra regressors needed in the selection equation of the Heckman model, following arguments 
explained in the following main text. The instrumental variable PREMIUM we use is the individual 
unconditional expectation evaluated with the estimated Heckman model.  
8
 The occupational sector dummies are used to generate exclusion restrictions, both in our insurance 
choice model and in the selection equation of the Heckman model on which premium prediction is 
based (see previous note). We checked that the coefficients on sector dummies in our main model 
are almost unchanged when we exclude the variable PREMIUM from the specification. This lack of 
collinearity between PREMIUM and occupational variables is explained with the fact that premium 
prediction is the unconditional expectation in the Heckman model, and these variables do not enter 
into it through their linear combination.  
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case study and crucial for the inference on treatment effects and other parameters of 
interest. The impact of being covered by FP VHI on private consumption is now a large 
+92%. This larger impact hinges upon substitution for the public visits, which are reduced 
by -135%. Concerning the impact on the demand for public visits, according to our 
estimates, while being covered by NFP VHI has no effect under exogeneity, it leads to a 
large reduction (-117%) in the consumption of this class of visits, if endogeneity is allowed 
for. Under endogeneity, the insurance effects are estimated, controlling for unobservable 
characteristics simultaneously affecting the two visit counts and the choice of insurance 
coverage. According to our estimates, the unobservables that increase the probability of 
being doubly insured, raise the consumption of public visits while decreasing that of private 
ones. Somehow, we have a mixed pattern of adverse and favorable selection into insurance. 
A possible candidate for this pattern is individual risk aversion. Private specialist visits, 
indeed, are priced according to a more cumbersome and variable schedule. Thus risk averse 
individuals may be more willing than average to doubly insure and, simultaneously, rely 
less on private visits.9  
Insert Table 5 here  
5.4. UTILIZATION RESULTS: DEMAND ELASTICITIES 
The regressors' coefficients (see table A1) are, with few exceptions, quite precisely 
estimated and consistent with previous empirical evidence on the determinants of visits 
counts (Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995); Deb and Trivedi (1997, 2002); Fabbri and 
Monfardini (2003); Atella and Deb (2008)). Within our specification, the estimated demand 
elasticities represent partial demand responses to a small perturbation of the equilibrium in 
the local market for public and private consultancy (see Fabbri and Monfardini (2009)). In 
particular, we can estimate a full set of (own- and cross-) price and waiting time elasticities.  
Our results (see Table 6) suggest that the demand for public specialist visits is moderately 
price sensitive. The own-price elasticity we find, despite quite imprecisely estimated, is in 
the order of magnitude of those estimated in the literature (see the survey in Cutler (2002)). 
Namely, a 10% price increase reduces the average number of visits by 1.9%. It is worth 
noticing that a pattern of substitution prevails between public and private specialist 
consultations. Cross price elasticities are both positive. The impact of private fees on public 
                                                     
9
 Schmitz (2011) provides direct evidence on risk aversion being responsible for favorable selection 
into insurance using data from GSOEP. 
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demand is very imprecisely estimated, while the impact of public fees on private demand is 
quite large and significant. Administrative waiting time plays a less substantial role as a 
rationing tool for public visits, while it seems much more relevant for private visits, where 
the own-waiting time elasticity is about -2.3%. 
Being exempt, suffering from chronic conditions or being limited in ADL results in the 
consumption of more visits: all these variables are proxies of individual health status. 
Stating to be in good or in very good health reduces demand of both classes of visits. It is 
worth noting that highly educated individuals do not consume more private visits, while 
intermediate educated individuals consume more private specialist visits to the same extent 
of public ones (the coefficients of both the educational dummies have very similar 
magnitude in the private visit equation). These results can be consistent with the view 
purported by the Grossman model, that more educated individuals demand more health but 
less services, in that they are more efficient and better informed as consumers. Being 
employed presumably picks up the effect of time constraints due to working: these 
individuals consume more private visits, especially if employed in a high position.  
The direct effect of household income is never significant. On the contrary, our proxy for 
wealth (i.e. home ownership) exerts a significant and large positive impact on the demand 
for private visits. These patterns also hold under exogeneity of the insurance status. 
Therefore, by looking at the demand equations only and noticing that neither income nor 
wealth negatively affect the demand for public visits, we might be induced to consider the 
Besley and Coate (1991) conjecture (i.e. the richer opt out from the public provision) to be 
violated in our case study.  
Insert Table 6 
 
5.5. INSURANCE CHOICE RESULTS  
Average marginal effects on insurance choice, of most of the regressors (see Table 7), are 
those expected. We find that a 10% increase in the individual local premium for a private 
VHI policy is associated with a 3.2% increase in the probability of being covered, just by 
the statutory health insurance. Concomitantly, the same increase is associated with a large 
reduction (-17.8%) in the probability of being covered by a FP VHI, and a less dramatic 
drop (-6.9%) in the probability of being covered by a NFP VHI. Coming to the effect of 
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differential waiting times to access the local public provisions of specialist case, our 
evidence is mixed and somehow conflicting with results in the literature (see Besley et al. 
(1999)). We find some effect on the demand for NFP VHI, but not on the demand for FP 
VHI. Apparently, the willingness to obtain a double coverage on top of SHI revealed by the 
choice of FP VHI does not respond to relative longer waits in accessing the local public 
supply.  
Insert Table 7 here 
Highs and lows in the magnitudes of associations between income and wealth and type of 
coverage are consistent with theory: higher income and richer individuals are more willing 
to get larger insurance coverage. Notice that this is so, even after having partialled out the 
effects of education. These latter are, again, consistent with the expected higher propensity 
to get insurance coverage among the more educated. Being employed is associated with a 
significant increase in the probability of being covered by VHI. The association is larger in 
the case of coverage granted by NFP VHI only (+87%), and by FP VHI (+27%). A more 
similar association pattern, across the two VHI status, applies to the effect of high position 
at work (i.e. approximately +50%). On the other hand, being an entrepreneur or a  self-
employed professional does not correlate with a larger probability of NFP coverage alone, 
while, it is associated with a large increase in the probability of being covered by FP VHI 
(+101%).  
Our proxies for health have, mostly, no significant marginal effects. Notice that the 
included characteristics are not used by the NFP insurer in setting contributions, nor in the 
definition of coverage, so that they might be considered as potential sources of asymmetric 
information. Therefore, it can be tentatively said that, the pool of individuals covered by a 
NFP VHI plan do not exhibit any compositional systematic difference in observed health 
risk factors unknown to the insurer. Our estimates of average marginal effects on insurance 
choice probabilities of being 1 year older (see Table 8), show some an increasing impact of 
age on enrolment into NFP VHI. This evidence could suggest that existing contribution to 
NFP VHI plans, which usually increases with age, does not discourage underwriting as 
individuals get older. Coming to enrolment into FP VHI, we find that the probability of 
coverage increases with both suffering from a chronic condition and being in good or very 
good self-rated health. Notice that this last characteristic is clearly unobservable to the 
insurer and has been shown to be a good predictor of future health conditions (see Idler and 
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Benyamini (1997)). Since it can be considered as a proxy for private information on 
individual health, our finding points towards a slightly favorable selection into FP VHI.  
Insert Table 8 here 
5.6. OPTING OUT OR TOPPING UP? 
According to our utilization results, neither income nor wealth have a direct negative effect 
on the demand for public visits. On the other hand, the insurance choice model estimates 
show that high income and richer individuals more frequently buy additional VHI coverage 
on top of SHI granted by the NHS. Provided that having a FP VHI coverage increases the 
demand for private visits and, concomitantly, reduces that for public visits, it can, therefore, 
be concluded that the Besley and Coate (1991) argument can be reestablished and qualified: 
the richer opt out from the public provision through a larger FP VHI underwriting.  
Insert Table 9 here 
To clarify this point, we sum up our evidence in Table 9, where a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation disentangles the direct and indirect effects of our proxies for income and wealth 
on public versus private consumption. We focus on the latter (i.e. house ownership), since 
results are more clear cut. According to estimates in Table 6, becoming a house owner 
increases the demand for public visits by 13.6% and the demand for private visits by 25%. 
However, this direct effect is not the end of the story, since the impact on visits also goes 
through the probability of being insured and moral hazard effects, conditional on being 
insured. Becoming a home owner increases the average baseline probability of being 
doubly insured with FP VHI by 26 pp, while that with NFP VHI by 19 pp. The effect for 
being doubly insured with FP VHI is to consume 135% less public visits and 92% more 
private ones, while that for being doubly insured with NFP VHI is to consume 117% less 
public visits and 69% more private. Therefore, the indirect effect on public and private 
visits consumption, determined by a switch to being a house owner via FP VHI, amounts to 
-35% and + 24% respectively, while that via NFP VHI is -22% and +13%. Largely, despite 
the direct effect of owning a house on public visits being positive, the indirect effects via 
NFP and FP VHI are both negative, so that the overall impact turn into negative (i.e. -44%). 
On the contrary, direct and indirect effects, of becoming house owners, on private visits are 
both positive, with the overall impact being a large 62%. The left part of Table 9 displays 
the same calculation under exogeneity. The direct effect of wealth on private visits is 
  19 
similar, while the indirect one is positive, despite being lower, with respect to the 
endogenous case. Quite remarkably, the indirect effects on private visits are now negligible, 
such that the total effect on private visits turns to be slightly positive. Therefore, under 
exogeneity, we would conclude in favor of topping up (i.e. the more affluent consuming 
larger quantities of the private supplements without reducing the consumption for the 
publicly provided private good). Allowing for the endogeneity of insurance status, notably, 
changes the picture in favor of the opting out hypothesis, thus implying that the more 
affluent do substitute the, lower quality, public provision for the superior private 
alternatives. Our modeling strategy proves to be crucial for answering this major question.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The public provision of a private good can work as a redistributive device. However, the 
availability of a voluntary private insurance might either strengthen or weaken the 
redistributive role played by the public provision of healthcare, in case adverse or favorable 
selection, respectively, prevails in the insurance market. We consider this issue and explore 
the impact of the endogenous selection mechanism into private voluntary insurance on 
visits consumption in the Italian NHS. In Italy about 21% of the population is doubly 
covered by some form of voluntary health insurance and a prominent share of the supply is 
publicly provided under statutory insurance. To gauge some hints upon the redistributive 
impacts produced by the Italian NHS, we jointly model the demand for both public and 
private healthcare demand accounting for the endogeneity of health insurance status, 
distinguishing between not-for-profit (NFP) VHI and for-profit (FP) VHI. The resulting 
modeling framework is a simultaneous equation system with multinomial endogenous 
treatment which represents a novel contribution o the existing literature on count data 
models. We show that having a FP VHI coverage increases the demand for private visits 
and, concomitantly, reduces that for public visits. We disentangle the effect of income and 
wealth by going through two channels: the direct impact on the demand for healthcare and 
that due to selection into VHI. Both of them suggest that richer and wealthier individuals 
consume more private services but do concomitantly reduce those publicly provided, only 
through selection into insurance status. These results imply that the market for VHI eases 
the redistribution from high income (doubly insured) individuals to low income (not doubly 
insured) ones operated by the Italian NHS. This is in line with the basic tenet of the Besley 
and Coate (1991) argument (i.e. the richer opt out from the public provision). Allowing for 
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endogeneity of insurance status is proved to be crucial for answering our research question: 
under exogeneity, the alternative conclusion would be derived that the more affluent 
individuals top up, rather than opt out. 
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Table 1: The market for insurance in Italy 
Our insurance status variable FREQ % 
NO VHI 22,074 79.0% 
NFP VHI only 2,689 9.6% 
FP VHI  3,182 11.4% 
total 27,945 100.0% 
Source: Elaborations on our sample from “Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie: condizioni di salute e ricorso ai servizi  
Sanitari 1999-2000”. 
 
Table 2: Frequency of specialists visits by type 
N° Visits Public Specialist Private specialist Any type 
0 94.5% 95.4% 90.4% 
1 4.3% 3.7% 7.1% 
2 0.9% 0.7% 1.7% 
3 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 
4 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 
+4 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
    
N° Obs. 27,945 27,945 27,945 
Positives 1,543 1,295 2,682 
Participation Rate 5.5% 4.6% 9.6% 
Source: Elaborations on our sample 
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Table 3: Specialists visits & insurance status in our case study 
 average # of visits  % of positives 
INSURANCE STATUS PUBLIC PRIVATE TOTAL  PUBLIC PRIVATE TOTAL 
NO VHI 0.079 0.057 0.136  5.8% 4.3% 9.6% 
NFP VHI only 0.067 0.066 0.132  5.3% 5.2% 9.9% 
FP VHI 0.054 0.083 0.137  4.0% 6.2% 9.5% 
ALL 0.075 0.061 0.136  5.5% 4.6% 9.6% 
        
Relative ME (no controls)        
NFP VHI only -0.174* 0.141 -0.030  -0.090 0.176* 0.037 
FP VHI -0.382*** 0.376*** 0.007  -0.367*** 0.369*** -0.005 
Source: Elaborations on our sample. ***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
  26 
Table 4: Regressors of the joint model for visit count and insurance choice 
VARIABLE  Mean Std. Dev. 
Enter which 
equation 
HEALTH 
    
EXEMPT =1 if exempted 0.17 0.38 BOTH 
INVALID =1 if invalid 0.04 0.18 BOTH 
CHRONIC. =1 if any chronic condition 0.53 0.50 BOTH 
NCHRONIC number of chronic conditions 1.17 1.60 BOTH 
LIM ADL =1 if any limitation in daily activity 0.04 0.20 BOTH 
SRH good =1 if self reported health good or very good 0.58 0.49 BOTH 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
    
AGE age (years) 49.05 11.93 BOTH 
AGESQ age squared/100 25.49 11.75 BOTH 
MARRIED =1 if married 0.86 0.35 BOTH 
MEDIUM EDUC =1 if secondary school certificate 0.30 0.46 BOTH 
HIGH EDUC =1 if university degree 0.08 0.27 BOTH 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
    
EMPLOYED =1 if employed 0.70 0.46 BOTH 
SELF-EMPL =1 if self-employed 0.23 0.42 BOTH 
HIGH POSITION  =1 if high professional position  0.06 0.24 BOTH 
HIGH POSITION SELF-EMPL =1 if high position & self-employed 0.08 0.26 BOTH 
ECONOMIC - INDIVIDUAL 
    
INCOME Monthly equalized family income* 5.41 4.51 BOTH 
HOME OWNERSHIP =1 if house owner 0.75 0.43 BOTH 
ECONOMIC-LHA 
    
PUBLIC EXP  Per capita public health expend. (x 1000 euro) 0.99 0.22 BOTH 
PHYSICIAN DENSITY Physician density (×1000 inhabitants) 5.21 1.41 BOTH 
FEE PUBLIC Public specialist visit price* 0.07 0.04 VISITS 
FEE PRIVATE Private specialist visit price* 0.33 0.05 VISITS 
PRICE NON FOOD BUNDLE Monthly equalized non food family expenditure* 1.32 0.25 VISITS 
WAIT PUBLIC Weeks for obtaining public specialist visit  1.84 0.70 VISITS 
WAIT PRIVATE Weeks for obtaining private specialist visit 0.85 0.39 VISITS 
HIGH DIFF IN WAIT =1 if WAIT PUBLIC - WAIT PRIVATE > 0.8 0.52 0.50 INSURANCE 
CONTEXT 
    
CHIEF TOWN =1 if living in a chief town 0.25 0.43 BOTH 
REGIONAL FIXED EFFECTS 19 dummies, reference group: Lombardia ..... BOTH 
INSTRUMENTS 
    
PREMIUM Monthly equalized premium for FP VHI* 8.09 1.54 INSURANCE 
CHILDREN =1 if have kids below 18 0.42 0.49 INSURANCE 
#CHILDREN # kids below 18 0.66 0.89 INSURANCE 
AGRICULTURE =1 if employed in agriculture 0.05 0.23 INSURANCE 
RETAIL TRADE =1 if employed in retail trade 0.15 0.36 INSURANCE 
TRANSPORTS =1 if employed in transport sector 0.06 0.23 INSURANCE 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES =1 if employed in professional services 0.05 0.22 INSURANCE 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION =1 if employed in public administration 0.08 0.27 INSURANCE 
EDUCATION =1 if employed in education sector 0.06 0.23 INSURANCE 
ENDOGENOUS DUMMIES     
NFP VHI only =1 if doubly insured with NFP VHI only 0.10 0.29 VISITS 
FP VHI =1 if doubly insured with FP and possibly NFP VHI 0.11 0.32 VISITS 
* As a share of LHA food expenditure 
  27 
Table 5: Moral hazard and selection effects 
 
EXOGENOUS 
INSURANCE  
ENDOGENOUS 
INSURANCE 
 
PUBLIC 
visits 
PRIVATE 
visits  
PUBLIC 
visits 
PRIVATE 
visits 
NFP VHI only 0.074 0.191***  -1.175*** 0.695*** 
 (0.103) (0.107)  (0.105 (0.125 
FP VHI -0.069 0.424***  -1.353*** 0.925*** 
 (0.112) (0.096)  (0.117 (0.112 
PRIV2λ
 
1.482  2.358 
 (0.066)  (0.087) 
h1λ
 
  
 1.586*** -2.600*** 
   
 (0.073) (0.073) 
Parameters are estimated Simulated Maximum Likelihood with 2000 Halton quasi-random 
draws. The outcomes density is specified as Poisson-normal mixture. Robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6: Demand elasticities under endogeneity of insurance. 
 
PUBLIC 
VISITS  
PRIVATE 
VISITS 
NFP VHI only -1.175***  0.695*** 
FP VHI -1.353***  0.925*** 
EXEMPT 0.445***  0.257 
INVALID 0.131  0.148 
CHRONIC. 0.528***  0.615*** 
NCHRONIC 0.136***  0.184*** 
LIM ADL 0.542***  0.724*** 
SRH good -0.622***  -0.615*** 
AGE -1.199  -1.477 
AGESQ 0.552  0.826 
MARRIED 0.027  0.083 
MEDIUM EDUC 0.266***  0.229*** 
HIGH EDUC 0.19  0.1 
EMPLOYED 0.139  0.217* 
SELF-EMPL 0.22  0.135 
HIGH POSITION  0.288*  0.161 
HIGH POSITION SELF-EMPL -0.007  -0.063 
INCOME 0.002  0.047 
HOME OWNERSHIP 0.136*  0.251*** 
PUBLIC EXP  0.089  0.099 
PHYSICIAN DENSITY 0.06  0.029 
FEE PUBLIC -0.191  0.229* 
FEE PRIVATE 0.126  0.048 
PRICE NON FOOD BUNDLE 0.289  -0.229 
WAIT PUBLIC -0.137  0.092 
WAIT PRIVATE -0.088  -0.232*** 
CHIEF TOWN  0.114  0.05 
***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 7: Average marginal effects of covariates (elast.&semi-elast.) on insurance 
choice. 
 
NO Double 
insurance DI with NFP only DI with FP 
EXEMPT 0.013 -0.019 -0.073 
INVALID -0.004 -0.122 0.133 
CHRONIC. -0.034*** 0.059 0.184*** 
NCHRONIC -0.003 0.037 -0.006 
LIM ADL 0.010 -0.034 -0.038 
SRH good -0.027*** 0.071 0.125*** 
MARRIED -0.013 0.177*** -0.059 
MEDIUM EDUC -0.103*** 0.447*** 0.337*** 
HIGH EDUC -0.129*** 0.423*** 0.537*** 
EMPLOYED -0.146*** 0.875*** 0.274*** 
SELF-EMPL -0.134*** 0.497*** 0.511*** 
HIGH POSITION  -0.017 -0.053 0.162*** 
HIGH POSITION SELF-EMPL -0.155*** 0.075 1.010*** 
INCOME -0.012*** 0.029 0.043** 
HOME OWNERSHIP -0.061*** 0.188*** 0.262*** 
PREMIUM 0.317*** -0.694** -1.787*** 
PUBLIC EXP  0.025 0.227 -0.352** 
PHYSICIAN DENSITY 0.073*** -0.218** -0.340*** 
HIGH DIFF IN WAIT -0.021** 0.134*** 0.029 
CHIEF TOWN -0.008 0.049 0.016 
***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8: AME of being 1 year older on insurance choice. 
 
NO Double 
insurance 
DI with NFP 
only DI with FP 
At age=20 0.0024 0.0016*** -0.0040 
At age=30 0.0012 0.0025*** -0.0036 
At age=40 -0.0004 0.0037** -0.0033 
At age=50 -0.0022 0.0051 -0.0029 
At age=60 -0.0042 0.0067 -0.0025** 
***, **, * denotes significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9: Opt out vs. top up. 
 Under Exogeneity  Under Endogeneity 
PUBLIC visits      
 Income House own  Income House own 
Direct effect 0.00% 7.50%  0.20% 13.60% 
Indirect effect via NFP VHI 0.20% 1.40%  -3.40% -22.10% 
Indirect effect via FP VHI -0.30% -1.80%  -5.80% -35.40% 
Total effect -0.10% 7.10%  -9.00% -43.90% 
      
PRIVATE visits      
 Income House own  Income House own 
Direct effect 0.90% 25.60%  4.70% 25.10% 
Indirect effect via NFP VHI 0.60% 3.60%  2.00% 13.10% 
Indirect effect via FP VHI 1.80% 11.10%  4.00% 24.20% 
Total effect 3.30% 40.30%  10.70% 62.40% 
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Table A1: Model estimates 
 DOUBLY INSURED WITH  VISITS COUNT 
 
NFP VHI 
only  FP VHI  PUBLIC   PRIVATE  
NFP VHI only     -1.175***  0.695*** 
     0.105  0.125 
FP VHI     -1.353***  0.925*** 
     0.117  0.112 
EXEMPT -0.055  -0.109  0.445**  0.257 
 0.081  0.079  0.174  0.179 
INVALID -0.121  0.135  0.131  0.148 
 0.162  0.141  0.123  0.147 
CHRONIC 0.118*  0.238***  0.528***  0.615*** 
 0.066  0.063  0.086  0.090 
NCHRONIC 0.037  0.002  0.116***  0.158*** 
 0.024  0.023  0.019  0.021 
LIM ADL -0.065  -0.063  0.542***  0.724*** 
 0.155  0.148  0.104  0.124 
SRH good 0.121**  0.165***  -0.622***  -0.615*** 
 0.055  0.053  0.073  0.075 
AGE 0.048  -0.024  -0.024  -0.030 
 0.031  0.031  0.021  0.026 
AGESQ -0.058  0.022  0.022  0.032 
 0.036  0.036  0.022  0.027 
MARRIED 0.213***  -0.020  0.027  0.083 
 0.074  0.068  0.088  0.099 
MEDIUM EDUC 0.636***  0.535***  0.266***  0.229*** 
 0.054  0.053  0.076  0.080 
HIGH EDUC 0.659***  0.786***  0.190  0.100 
 0.100  0.091  0.158  0.143 
EMPLOYED 1.113***  0.502***  0.139  0.217* 
 0.113  0.111  0.092  0.115 
SELF-EMPL 0.351***  1.293***  -0.007  -0.063 
 0.070  0.066  0.105  0.104 
HIGH POSITION 0.744***  0.758***  0.220  0.135 
 0.089  0.093  0.163  0.143 
HIGH POSITION SELF-EMPL -0.010  0.200**  0.288*  0.161 
 0.100  0.081  0.151  0.141 
INCOME 0.008*  0.011**  0.000  0.009 
 0.005  0.004  0.007  0.006 
HOME OWNERSHIP 0.291***  0.365***  0.136  0.251*** 
 0.057  0.056  0.073  0.083 
PUBLIC EXP 0.177  -0.423  0.090  0.100 
 0.196  0.190  0.239  0.275 
PHYSICIAN DENSITY -0.064***  -0.089***  0.012  0.005 
 0.024  0.022  0.031  0.033 
FEE PUBLIC     -2.599  3.105* 
     1.803  1.702 
FEE PRIVATE     0.386  0.147 
     0.738  0.823 
PRICE NON FOOD BUNDLE     0.220  -0.173 
     0.199  0.229 
WAIT PUBLIC     -0.075  0.050 
     0.061  0.068 
WAIT PRIVATE     -0.103  -0.271*** 
     0.089  0.100 
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Table A1: Model estimates. Continues… 
 DOUBLY INSURED WITH  VISITS COUNT 
 
NFP VHI 
only  FP VHI  PUBLIC  PRIVATE 
HIGH DIFF IN WAIT 0.163***  0.063     
 0.059  0.056     
CHIEF TOWN 0.066  0.034  0.114  0.050 
 0.058  0.054  0.081  0.083 
PREMIUM -0.150***  -0.285***     
 0.052  0.055     
CHILDREN -0.041  -0.191**     
 0.094  0.093     
#CHILDREN -0.051  0.072     
 0.050  0.049     
AGRICULTURE -0.368***  -0.410***     
 0.111  0.113     
RETAIL TRADE -0.147**  0.043     
 0.071  0.068     
TRANSPORTS 0.095  0.143     
 0.093  0.099     
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 0.527***  0.566***     
 0.094  0.092     
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION -0.610***  -0.291***     
 0.095  0.102     
EDUCATION -0.719***  -0.111     
 0.113  0.103     
CONSTANT -3.555***  0.321  -4.688***  -4.800*** 
 0.998  1.001  0.746  0.832 
PUB1λ  1.586***       
 0.073       
PRIV1λ  -2.600***       
 0.073       
PRIV2λ  2.358***       
 0.087       
        
Number of observations  27945       
Wald chi2(49)    1474.890       
Log likelihood -29003.69       
 
 
 
